Wealth Security Protocol
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  • 🗺️Overview
  • 💜Casa vs. Alternatives
    • Introduction
    • Option #1: Do-it-yourself
    • Option #2: Custodial Storage
    • Option #3: Commercial Systems
  • 🔑System Design Principles
    • Introduction
    • Minimal Knowledge
    • High Security
    • Usability is Security
    • Expert Support
    • Redundancy
    • Sovereignty
    • Incentive Alignment
  • 🚨Threat Overview
    • Introduction
    • Data and Credential Loss
    • Phishing
    • SIM Hijacking
    • Network Attacks
    • Malware
    • Supply Chain Attack
    • Physical Coercion
    • Child/Pet Attack
    • Internal Service Provider Attack
    • Platform / Hosting Provider Attack
    • Code Dependency Attack
    • Official Seizure
    • Inheritance Failure
  • 🔐Chosen Features
    • Introduction
    • Hardware Wallet Signing
    • Multi-signature
    • Multi-location
    • Heterogeneous Hardware and Software
    • Seedless Hardware Wallets
    • Emergency Recovery Key
    • PIN or Biometrics for Mobile Key only
    • PIN for every device
    • Sovereign Recovery Instructions
    • Emergency Lockdown Button
    • Health Check
    • Identity Verification for Account Recovery
    • Inheritance
  • ✅Chosen Key Schemes
    • 5-Key Vault
    • 3-Key Vault
    • Pay Wallet
  • ❌Rejected Key Schemes
    • Shamir's Secret Sharing
    • 2-of-2
    • 1-of-2
  • ❌Rejected Features
    • Biometrics General Usage
    • Brain Wallet -- Memory Based Solutions
  • 🔧Remaining Attack Vectors
    • Address Spoofing
    • Malicious Insider Key Theft
    • Extreme disaster scenarios
    • Extortion
  • 👨‍🚀Future Improvements
    • Taproot/MAST
    • Schnorr Signatures
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  1. 🚨Threat Overview

Supply Chain Attack

PreviousMalwareNextPhysical Coercion

Last updated 1 year ago

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All key storage software depends on some hardware to run, whether that be a phone, laptop, server, or hardware wallet. There are multiple places where malicious code or hardware can be inserted into the supply chain. Fake hardware wallets . Earlier in the supply chain, malicious chips or even tainted firmware can be inserted by someone who has access. Keep in mind the attacker might not be the creator of the hardware wallet. The attacker could be a manufacturing partner or a single rogue employee.

Mitigation:

  • Always check authenticity of hardware and integrity of tamper-proof seals.

  • Do not use only one brand of hardware wallet or software system. Use a mix.

  • Use a multi-signature (multi-key) system that will enable recovery even if one of your hardware wallet types is compromised by an attacker or found to have a flaw/bug.

have been spotted in the wild