Wealth Security Protocol
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Overview
💜Casa vs. Alternatives
Introduction
Option #1: Do-it-yourself
Option #2: Custodial Storage
Option #3: Commercial Systems
🔑System Design Principles
Introduction
Minimal Knowledge
High Security
Usability is Security
Expert Support
Redundancy
Sovereignty
Incentive Alignment
🚨Threat Overview
Introduction
Data and Credential Loss
Phishing
SIM Hijacking
Network Attacks
Malware
Supply Chain Attack
Physical Coercion
Child/Pet Attack
Internal Service Provider Attack
Platform / Hosting Provider Attack
Code Dependency Attack
Official Seizure
Inheritance Failure
🔐Chosen Features
Introduction
Hardware Wallet Signing
Multi-signature
Multi-location
Heterogeneous Hardware and Software
Seedless Hardware Wallets
Emergency Recovery Key
PIN or Biometrics for Mobile Key only
PIN for every device
Sovereign Recovery Instructions
Emergency Lockdown Button
Health Check
Identity Verification for Account Recovery
✅Chosen Key Schemes
5-Key Vault
3-Key Vault
Pay Wallet
❌Rejected Key Schemes
Shamir's Secret Sharing
2-of-2
1-of-2
❌Rejected Features
Biometrics General Usage
Brain Wallet -- Memory Based Solutions
🔧Remaining Attack Vectors
Address Spoofing
Malicious Insider Key Theft
Extreme disaster scenarios
Extortion
👨🚀Future Improvements
Taproot/MAST
Schnorr Signatures
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1-of-2
1-of-2 multisig offers some resistance against loss, but it offers insufficient protection against theft. If any one key is compromised, a thief will be able to steal the user’s funds.
❌Rejected Key Schemes - Previous
2-of-2
Next - ❌Rejected Features
Biometrics General Usage
Last modified
1mo ago
