Wealth Security Protocol
Go to Casa Home
  • 🗺️Overview
  • 💜Casa vs. Alternatives
    • Introduction
    • Option #1: Do-it-yourself
    • Option #2: Custodial Storage
    • Option #3: Commercial Systems
  • 🔑System Design Principles
    • Introduction
    • Minimal Knowledge
    • High Security
    • Usability is Security
    • Expert Support
    • Redundancy
    • Sovereignty
    • Incentive Alignment
  • 🚨Threat Overview
    • Introduction
    • Data and Credential Loss
    • Phishing
    • SIM Hijacking
    • Network Attacks
    • Malware
    • Supply Chain Attack
    • Physical Coercion
    • Child/Pet Attack
    • Internal Service Provider Attack
    • Platform / Hosting Provider Attack
    • Code Dependency Attack
    • Official Seizure
    • Inheritance Failure
  • 🔐Chosen Features
    • Introduction
    • Hardware Wallet Signing
    • Multi-signature
    • Multi-location
    • Heterogeneous Hardware and Software
    • Seedless Hardware Wallets
    • Emergency Recovery Key
    • PIN or Biometrics for Mobile Key only
    • PIN for every device
    • Sovereign Recovery Instructions
    • Emergency Lockdown Button
    • Health Check
    • Identity Verification for Account Recovery
    • Inheritance
  • ✅Chosen Key Schemes
    • 5-Key Vault
    • 3-Key Vault
    • Pay Wallet
  • ❌Rejected Key Schemes
    • Shamir's Secret Sharing
    • 2-of-2
    • 1-of-2
  • ❌Rejected Features
    • Biometrics General Usage
    • Brain Wallet -- Memory Based Solutions
  • 🔧Remaining Attack Vectors
    • Address Spoofing
    • Malicious Insider Key Theft
    • Extreme disaster scenarios
    • Extortion
  • 👨‍🚀Future Improvements
    • Taproot/MAST
    • Schnorr Signatures
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  1. 🔧Remaining Attack Vectors

Address Spoofing

While the Casa system is highly secure, the user still needs to obtain a destination address for each transaction from an exchange or wallet outside Casa’s systems. Malware on a user’s computer could theoretically cause their web browser or other communication software to display an incorrect address. This would defeat the security of any storage system, as it occurs outside of that system.

Mitigation:

  • Use of a mobile app mitigates browser extension based address modification.

  • We re-derive receiving addresses independently on both server and mobile device. The app will throw an error if there is a mismatch between server and mobile device.

  • Use of a separate non-Casa "watch only wallet" allows for independent validation of addresses.

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Last updated 1 year ago

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